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Securing a Shared Hidden Resource:  
Governance Mechanisms for Transboundary Groundwater Security  
 





Globally, groundwater is the largest store of liquid freshwater, making it a key component of a secure 
water supply. However, over the past few decades, the amount of subsurface water available around the 
world has been rapidly decreasing. This depletion is caused mostly by mismanagement (e.g., 
overpumping and under-regulation), but also by reduced natural recharge due to climate change and 
urbanization. Management of groundwater resources is particularly challenging for the nearly 600 
aquifers that are transboundary, meaning that they extend across international political borders. Because 
groundwater is stored underground, this “hidden” resource is difficult to monitor, assess, and manage. 
Few international legal frameworks guide the governance of transboundary water resources, and such 
frameworks as exist are limited by lack of commitment, weak institutional arrangements, insufficient 
financial resources, and inadequate enforcement. International norms are typically implemented through 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, a process that reveals the important role of national capacity in 
managing transboundary resources, but that have mostly ignored groundwater resources. Further, rapid 
expansion in both the number and scope of global groundwater initiatives points to the growing role of 
new actors, perspectives, and functions in promoting secure access to and use of shared groundwater 





















Accounting for 97% of liquid freshwater, groundwater is a critical component of global water supply 
(Margat and van der Gun 2013). Household, industrial, and agriculture water users depend heavily on 
groundwater supplies. Globally, over 2.5 billion people rely on groundwater as a primary domestic water 
source, particularly in rural areas (UN WWDR 2015), and up to 24% of industrial water use comes from 
groundwater (Döll et al. 2012). In agriculture, groundwater accounts for 43% of water for crop irrigation 
worldwide, having major direct implications on food security (Siebert et al. 2010). While most agriculture 
is still rainfed, irrigated agriculture now provides approximately 40% of human food supply (Aeschbach-
Hertig and Gleeson 2012). In addition to increasing population and economic growth, expansion of 
irrigated agriculture—especially when technologies with sub-optimal water-efficiency are used—further 
strains groundwater resources (Wada and Heinrich 2013). Human use depletes groundwater globally 
(IPCC 2013, Wada et al. 2010) -- over the past few decades, extraction rates have been increasing by 3% 
annually (Conti 2016) Adding to this trend, groundwater is not immune to climate change—recharge rates 
and groundwater levels are impacted by precipitation variability and extreme events (IPCC 2013 Taylor et 
al. 2013, Wada 2016). Finally, urbanization not only increases municipal water demand but, as cities 
grow and expand, the areal extent of impervious surfaces (e.g., concrete and asphalt) increases, 
preventing the natural recharge of aquifers and thereby decreasing groundwater levels. 
The water security discourse has emerged at a time when states and especially global organizations have 
begun to turn their attention to crises of water supply, effectively “securitizing” discourse over water 
management (Staddon and James, 2013). Nevertheless, if we consider groundwater within a water 
security framework, we see how the nature of water supplies is multi-dimensional. A water security 
framework recognizes the need for an adequate quantity of high-quality water, but it also addresses 
broader social, economic, and environmental aspects of how water supplies are accessed and used by 
society and ecosystems. Definitions of water security point to a variety of aspects such as water access 
(GWP 2000), protection from floods (Grey and Sadoff 2007), water for ecosystem health (GWP 2000, 
Grey and Sadoff 2007, Bakker 2012, Scott et al. 2013), human health (Grey and Sadoff 2007, Bakker 
2012), national security (Bakker 2012), sustainability, uncertainty, and resilience to global change (Scott 
et al. 2013).1 Beyond contributing to the volume and availability of water supplies across the globe, 
groundwater contributes to water security in many ways that are distinct from surface water. For example, 
in arid areas, groundwater supplies are more locally accessible than surface water, and because aquifers 
can store large volumes of water, they contribute to drought resilience of the overall water supply. 
Despite its manifest and rising importance for global water security, groundwater is often poorly managed 
(Famiglietti 2014). Groundwater is subject to the full array of management challenges of any common-
pool resource, because it is difficult to exclude new users and overuse of the resource can ultimately 
reduce the amount available for others (Ostrom et al. 1999), particularly in local contexts. Because 
groundwater systems are difficult to observe (both literally—i.e., by eye—and scientifically, i.e., with 
reference to its essential properties), they are also difficult to assess, scrutinize, and monitor. Unique 
physical characteristics of groundwater systems, such as long residence times and delayed responses, 
make monitoring and detection of impact difficult (Foster and MacDonald 2014). For example, 
contamination released at the ground surface may take days to weeks or longer to reach the aquifer, and 
may travel considerable distances underground—and across international boundaries, where such borders 
are present. Groundwater depletion can have unpredictable impacts on water quality and use, as well as 
on aquifer sustainability (Aeschbach-Hertig and Gleeson 2012). Moreover, physical characteristics 
                                                 
1 We use the definition by Scott, et al. 2013: “Water security constitutes the sustainable availability of adequate 
quantities and qualities of water for resilient societies and ecosystems in the face of uncertain global change.” For a 
full discussion of the various definitions, see Gerlak et al. In review. 
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governing the direction, rate, and ease of groundwater flow can vary dramatically both within and among 
aquifers. Because of the hidden nature of groundwater, sustainable management is even more challenging. 
Nearly 600 groundwater aquifers are shared by more than one country (see Figure 1; IGRAC 2015; Conti 
2016).2 When aquifers traverse international borders, their management—problematic in any case—is 
additionally complicated by the involvement of two or more nations that may have different policies, 
institutional arrangements, cultures, and socioeconomics.3 Their transboundary nature requires national-
level institutions be involved in governance, yet, sub-national groundwater systems are typically managed 
locally (Aeschbach-Hertig and Gleeson 2012, Conti 2016). In addition, the effects of groundwater 
depletion can now be seen to extend to the regional scale. Remote sensing technologies have provided 
new capabilities for observing groundwater depletion at regional scales (e.g., Gravity Recovery and 
Climate Experiment [GRACE]), yet, complementary local data are often insufficiently available for these 
shared aquifers (Linton and Brooks 2011, Conti 2016).  With rapid population growth, economic 
development, and increasing dependence on groundwater for irrigation and household use, stress on 
transboundary groundwater systems has increased rapidly over the past 50 years (Wada and Heinrich 
2013). Yet, few international legal mechanisms exist specifically for transboundary water management 
(Puri and Aureli 2005), and those that address groundwater are still in the initial stages of development 
(Nanni and Foster 2005, Sugg et al. 2015, Conti 2016). In addition to improving our understanding of 
groundwater systems, technical approaches are most effective when they are complemented by 
coordinated and cooperative policy and governance explicitly at the transboundary level.  
Improving mechanisms for transboundary groundwater governance will have direct implications for water 
security. This paper reviews the status of international efforts to govern transboundary groundwater. In 
the next section, we set the stage for governance and management by describing the distinctive physical 
characteristics of groundwater. We continue by identifying and discussing the most significant challenges 
this unseen resource poses for effective management. Then, we consider the status of international legal 
mechanisms for transboundary groundwater, including a review of existing international groundwater 
frameworks, international legal principles, and transboundary groundwater treaties. This discussion is 
followed by a section that takes a more telescopic view by reviewing the major global initiatives that have 
influenced the trajectory of international governance of shared groundwater resources. Finally, we 
highlight six selected themes that characterize the state of knowledge on transboundary groundwater 
governance in academic and policy literature, and offer important recommendations.  
 
2.0 Physical characteristics of groundwater resources 
 
Groundwater aquifers consist of permeable rock units that are saturated and able to yield sufficient 
quantities of water to be utilized as a water resource (Margat and van der Gun 2013; Lohman et al. 1972). 
Three general categories of aquifers include unconfined, confined, and fossil aquifers. Unconfined 
aquifers are well-connected with surface water, and are recharged, often rapidly, by surface infiltration. 
Unconfined aquifers can either receive water from or supply water to streams. The direction of flow 
between streams and aquifers can vary among stream reaches based on the topography and aquifer 
characteristics, and can vary seasonally. For instance, within the same stretch, a stream might lose water 
to the aquifer in summer months and gain water from the aquifer in winter months. Confined aquifers 
occur in rock units that are sealed above and below by impermeable layers that prevent interaction with 
surface water (Schwartz and Zhang 2003). Confined aquifers are recharged by precipitation that infiltrates 
in limited “recharge zones” where aquifer units are exposed at the ground surface. For confined aquifers, 
coordinated land management in recharge areas, which may be far removed from the location of 
                                                 
2  And this number is rising as scientific efforts to identify, map, and characterize aquifers proceeds. 
3 For a discussion of how new international borders complicated natural-resources management at the time of the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, see Udall and Varady 1994. 
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groundwater extraction, is needed to protect water quality and quantity in the aquifer, though this can 
pose problems when the areas of benefit (extraction) is located in a different jurisdiction to the area of 
cost (recharge) (Nanni and Foster 2005). Groundwater recharge is also affected by the timing, location, 
and amount of precipitation, evapotranspiration, snowfall and snow melt (Kløve et al. 2014), and the type 
of surfaces in urban settlements (e.g., pervious vs. impervious). Finally, “fossil” aquifers store water that 
may have accumulated thousands of years ago. These aquifers receive no recharge, and therefore have 
finite quantities of water.  Once “mined” these resources may be gone forever. 
 
Within these three broad categories, aquifers’ properties vary widely, and individual aquifers can be 
internally heterogeneous (Puri and Aureli 2005). Aquifer characteristics, such as porosity, permeability, 
and conductivity, affect in-situ flow rates of groundwater, the nature and extent of impacts of 
overextraction, the rate at which water can be extracted, and how much water the aquifer can produce. For 
example, flow rates within aquifers vary from 0.01 to 10 meters per day and groundwater can remain 
within an aquifer for anything from a few years to thousands of years (Foster et al. 2013).  
 
Aquifers exhibit physical characteristics that make groundwater a desirable water resource, but they also 
present some unique challenges for governance. Differences in the physical characteristics of surface 
water and groundwater aquifers that have implications for water governance are summarized in Table 1. 
Compared to surface water, groundwater is often of higher quality. During recharge, precipitation 
infiltrates through overlying materials which serve as natural filtration (and is a key principle of artificial 
recharge schemes). In arid and semi-arid areas, groundwater aquifers provide a local water source, where 
surface water may be scarce or need to be transported long distances. Aquifers, particularly confined 
aquifers, can offer storage capacity that buffers seasonal fluctuations in precipitation and surface water 
availability. Aquifer storage can also be utilized for long-term storage through water banking practices—
where surface water is used to recharge aquifers for future use (Maliva 2014), and as a buffer against the 
effects of climate variability (Green et al. 2011). Although aquifer storage varies spatially, it is 
nonetheless a significant contributor to water supply in many areas (Foster and MacDonald 2014). 
However, estimates of global groundwater storage are approximately three orders of magnitude greater 
than those of global groundwater recharge, suggesting a looming crisis (van der Gun 2012). 
 
Another important difference between groundwater and surface water is the much slower pace of 
groundwater flow in aquifers (Giordano 2009). Flow rates within aquifers vary from 0.01 to 10 meters per 
day and groundwater can remain in the aquifer for years to thousands of years (Foster et al. 2013). 
Because groundwater transport is slow, impacts of overextraction or pollution can be delayed, spatially 
dislocated, and difficult to detect. Therefore, the impacts of extraction or pollution may take months to 
years to be detected and the extent of contamination can be difficult to monitor over time. Remediation of 
groundwater pollution—which may use biological, chemical, or physical techniques—is nearly always 
time-consuming and expensive (Nanni and Foster 2005). Groundwater aquifers are also vulnerable to 
essentially irreversible impacts, such as salinization caused by infiltration of seawater into coastal 
aquifers, as in the aquifers bordering the Arabian Gulf (Murad et al 2011, Nanni and Foster 2005). 
Overextraction of groundwater can also mobilize naturally-occurring pollutants from the aquifer host 
rock, such as fluoride or arsenic (Foster et al. 2013), or draw in water of poor quality from hydraulically-
linked areas. Once disrupted, subsurface hydrostatic equilibria that supported large aquifer “lenses”, can 
be virtually impossible to re-establish. 
 
Although aquifers have limited extents, groundwater systems are connected to the broader environment. 
In unconfined aquifers, where groundwater is directly linked to surface water, overextraction in nearby 
wells can draw flow away from the stream, and create what are called “cones of depletion”, or areas of 
lowered water levels surrounding wells. Riparian ecosystems, or groundwater-dependent ecosystems in 
arid areas, can be negatively impacted by lowered water levels (Staddon and Everard 2017). Changes in 
the timing and location of precipitation and snow melt due to climate change will affect the annual 
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volume and timing of recharge for groundwater aquifers (Konikow and Kendy 2005, Kløve et al. 2014). 
Further, shifting patterns of groundwater abstraction due to climate change and land use may indirectly 
alter mechanisms of groundwater recharge (Kløve et al. 2014). Overall, the impacts of climate change on 
groundwater recharge are uncertain and vary regionally (Döll 2009) and may have compounding effects 
on groundwater security. 
 
3.0 International groundwater governance mechanisms  
 
We begin our examination of international groundwater governance mechanisms by looking first at 
specific functional approaches. We consider the current status of international legal frameworks, 
international legal principles, and transboundary groundwater treaties. The summary provided in Table 2 
complements our discussion in the following sections by tracing how groundwater is addressed by these 
various mechanisms.  
Despite being fairly widespread—and notwithstanding the emergence of a global aperture for water 
governance in the form of global water initiatives (Varady et al. 2009)—the use and effectiveness of legal 
mechanisms that actually govern transboundary aquifers remain relatively limited (Sugg et al. 2015, Conti 
2016). Among these, most mechanisms were originally devised for surface water resources and 
extended—though not necessarily adapted—to include groundwater. As a result, these instruments are 
being applied without meaningful consideration of fit and suitability for the special conditions of 
groundwater systems (Mechlem 2012).  
3.1 Existing international legal frameworks 
 
Transboundary groundwater was first addressed in international law by the International Law 
Association’s Helsinki Rules in 1966. The Helsinki Rules include groundwater in transboundary water 
laws. However confined aquifers—those not connected with surface water—were specifically excluded. 
In 1986, the International Law Association’s Seoul Rules extended coverage of transboundary water law 
by acknowledging differences between various types of aquifers, particularly between unconfined 
aquifers and confined aquifers (Jarvis 2007). However, the Helsinki and Seoul Rules, and the related 1989 
“Bellagio Model Agreement Concerning the Use of Transboundary Waters,” have had little impact on 
transboundary groundwater governance in practice (Eckstein and Eckstein 2005). Salman (2007) and 
Jarvis (2005) offer thorough examinations of the subtle differences among international laws with regards 
to transboundary groundwater. 
 
Perhaps the most influential international law regarding transboundary water is the 1997 Convention on 
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (“Watercourses Convention,” hereafter) (UN 
1997). The Watercourses Convention laid out several general principles that, in practice, have guided 
many international treaties and cooperative agreements. These principles include: equitable and 
reasonable utilization, no significant harm, good-faith cooperation, prior notification, and dispute 
settlement (Salman 2007, Eckstein and Eckstein 2005, UN 1997). Intentionally avoiding the term 
“watershed”4, the Watercourses Convention defines an “international watercourse” as including “surface 
waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus.” Thus, a “watercourse” is understood to include groundwater 
if that groundwater system “flows to a common terminus” either directly or via interconnection with a 
surface watercourse. By once again excluding confined aquifers, the Watercourses Convention disregards 
the contribution made over a decade earlier by the Seoul Rules. Based on this and other significant gaps, 
the Watercourses Convention fails to provide meaningful inclusion of transboundary groundwater that 
                                                 
4 A watershed is defined as the land area that contributes surface runoff to a given system of stream channels, and 
exists the basin at a common downstream location (Schwartz and Zhang 2003).  
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accounts for its physical, technical, economic, and social characteristics (Salman 2007). Because the 
Watercourses Convention does not address confined and fossil aquifers explicitly, the applicability of the 
principles put forth by the Watercourses Convention to various types of aquifers remains unclear 
(Eckstein and Eckstein 2005).  
 
Other legal regimes have been drafted more recently to address groundwater. The Berlin Rules, developed 
by the International Law Association in 2004, were more comprehensive and progressive, in terms of 
regard for consideration of environmental water needs, than the Watercourses Convention. In contrast to 
the Watercourses Convention, the Berlin Rules: (1) emphasize managing a shared watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner (versus equitable and reasonable shares for States), (2) place the 
principle of no significant harm on equal footing with equitable and reasonable use, and (3) include ample 
consideration for environmental needs and the human right to water (Salman 2007). However, unlike the 
1997 Watercourses Convention, the Berlin Rules do not seek to become legally binding, but rather to 
operate as a kind of “practitioners” or “best practice” guide (Staddon 2010) 
 
In 2008, the UN International Law Commission (ILC)’s Draft (with the emphasis on “draft”) Articles on 
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers were introduced (ILC 2008). The Law of Transboundary Aquifers 
addresses the gap in the Watercourses Convention by explicitly including confined aquifers. Although 
based on many of the principles laid out in the Watercourses Convention, the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers differs by including the principle of sovereignty5. McCaffrey (2011) argues that, although 
foundational to international relations, whereas the principle of sovereignty may apply to the rock units 
that make up the aquifer, when applied to movable groundwater resources, this principle conflicts with 
existing customary international watercourses law. He argues that the Draft Articles fail to distinguish 
between the aquifer units and the groundwater itself and thus, pose a challenge for implementation. The 
UN General Assembly considered the Draft Articles in recurrent sessions from 2008 through 2016, but 
Articles have not yet been finalized (UN 2016). We note here that it took the United Nations 27 years to 
adopt the Watercourses Convention after the concept was introduced in draft form in 1970, and then 
another 17 years to put it into force. Most observers envision a similar timeline for eventual approval of 
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers. 
 
Although the Berlin Rules and the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers mark attempts to 
address problems specific to aquifers in a more cohesive and binding way, international legal regimes 
remain largely voluntary. In practice, most international basins use the principles of the Watercourses 
Convention, in some capacity, to guide negotiations, design treaties, and development river basin 
organizations (Salman 2007, Mirumachi 2013). Although, the Watercourses Convention went into force 
in 2014 after being ratified by 35 countries (Zhong et al. 2016), enforcement applied only to participating 
nations. Implementation of other regimes devised to address groundwater discussed herein has been 
limited.6 
 
3.2 International legal principles: equitable and reasonable use and no harm 
 
As noted, international legal frameworks can offer the scaffolding for national groundwater policies 
regarding international issues. How are such frameworks, where they are deemed suitable, interpreted in 
regard to working legal principles?  
 
                                                 
5 The sovereignty principle states: “Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or 
aquifer system located within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance with international law and 
the present articles.” See  http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/118 
6 For a good discussion of the evolution of international groundwater law, see Stephan 2011. 
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Well-established international customary norms, the principles of equitable and reasonable use and no 
significant harm form the foundation of the Watercourses Convention. There has been protracted debate 
regarding the hierarchy of these two principles (Conca 2006). In practice, downstream riparian states tend 
to favor “no significant harm” because it protects existing uses against impacts from upstream states, 
whereas upstream states favor “equitable and reasonable use” because that affords current needs the same 
weight as historic uses (Salman 2007, Wolf 1999). There is a general consensus of opinion that the 
Watercourses Convention puts equitable and reasonable use first (Salman 2007), possibly because 
“reasonable use” has a centuries old foundation in Common Law (Staddon 2010).7 However, many 
suggest that the principle of “no significant harm” should be prioritized for groundwater, in order to better 
protect future uses and promote long-term sustainability (Linton and Brooks 2011). Groundwater aquifers 
are especially vulnerable to pollution and overextraction, due to the difficulty of monitoring and detecting 
change, time delays of impacts, and the high expense of remediation. Further, active groundwater 
management, including enhanced and controlled recharge and water banking, may be necessary to 
preserve aquifers (Schlager 2006). 
 
Applying well-established international customary norms for transboundary water management to 
groundwater presents challenges related to how groundwater systems are delineated and the different 
behavior of groundwater compared to surface water. Existing international laws typically exclude 
recharge and discharge areas from the definition of a groundwater aquifer (Eckstein 2004), despite their 
important role in the overall groundwater system. Eckstein and Eckstein (2005) evaluate how the 
Watercourses Convention applies to various groundwater systems. They delineate physical arrangements 
of a transboundary groundwater system based on: how the aquifer and river system intersect the 
international boundary, which portion of the aquifer or river system is transected, and whether the aquifer 
is hydraulically connected to a surface water body. Eckstein and Eckstein (2005) find two types of 
confined aquifers to which the Watercourses Convention would not apply: (1) a confined aquifer, 
disconnected from surface water, that crosses an international border and has its recharge area in one 
state, and (2) completely confined aquifers with no recharge. They also find one case of an unconfined 
aquifer whose treatment under the Watercourses Convention is unclear: an unconfined aquifer crossing a 
political boundary, that is hydrologically-connected to a river that does not cross a political boundary but 
is contained entirely within one State. In this case, to apply the principle of equitable and reasonable use, 
the entire aquifer and river would need to be managed as a single integrated system. 
 
While established legal principles apply to shared surface waters, when applied to groundwater, we must 
examine whether these principles produce the desired outcome of sustainable resource management. We 
see that legal principles that prioritize sustainability may be more appropriate for groundwater due to the 
high consequence of resource degradation. Further, groundwater systems occur in complex arrangements 
and involve recharge areas, aquifers, and discharge areas—various groundwater system arrangements 
require a closer look to determine how to apply existing legal principles most effectively. Treaties devised 
among two or more individual nations are used to lay out how legal principles will be applied in a given 
situation and context. 
 
3.3 Transboundary groundwater treaties 
 
It is yet another step to move from general legal principles—which as we have seen can be contentious 
and difficult to agree on—to practical legal instruments. When considering the governance and 
management of natural resources that cross international boundaries, the most common accepted 
                                                 
7 There is considerable debate in the water law literature about the relative priority of “reasonable” versus 
“equitable” use, and even whether or not they are legally equivalent – there is much case law to suggest that what is 
equitable is reasonable and vice versa.   Application to surface and groundwater is however complicated in some 
jurisdictions (e.g., western United States) by the principle of “prior appropriation.” 
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instruments are treaties. These require negotiation, agreement, and adoption. But those conditions, while 
necessary are usually insufficient. For treaties to be effective, there must be mutual good will and trust, 
and reciprocal enforcement of agreed-to terms. And with regard to these attributes, groundwater poses 
uniquely difficult challenges. 
 
In the same way that river basins do not conform to political boundaries, aquifers are often shared by two 
or more nations (Puri et al. 2008). Therefore, aquifer overexploitation and contamination on one side of a 
border, directly affects groundwater resources on the other side of that border. As a “hidden” resource, 
groundwater is not easy to manage, particularly at the transboundary scale. Partly for that reason, it also 
has been “hidden” in international water law (Giordano et al. 2014, Puri et al. 2008). While management 
of transboundary water resources has been debated for many years and progress has been made, 
transboundary groundwater management has been mostly excluded and, therefore, is still in its relative 
infancy (Puri et al. 2008). Many countries continue to treat groundwater resources similarly to the ways 
they treat other underground resources including gas and oil, which represents a “backward transition” in 
international water law (Conti and Gupta 2016), particularly with regard to unconfined aquifers, or 
renewable groundwater resources. Such a view also tends to exclude consideration of the natural 
environment and biodiversity (Brels et al. 2011). 
 
The inclusion of groundwater resources in transboundary water treaties happened fairly recently. In a 
review of transboundary water treaties, Giordano and others (2014) found that treaties that address 
groundwater were practically non-existent until they emerged in the early 1980s and then increased 
substantially in frequency in the last decades. But despite this growing interest, groundwater remains 
ignored in most treaties. Of the treaties reviewed by Giordano et al. (2014), only 14% include a 
groundwater component. Furthermore, most of the agreements that mention groundwater deal with it as 
an extension of surface water, while only a small number focus on regulating groundwater quality or 
quantity directly. 
 
Strong governance capacity in all transboundary nations is needed to support the implementation of 
treaties. Varady et al. (2016) identified four main governance capacity elements that include (1) 
institutional setting, (2) availability and access to information and science, (3) robustness of civil society, 
and (4) economic and regulatory frameworks. The institutional setting comprises the government, non-
governmental organizations, private agencies, and common managerial and decision-making practices.  
Fair, bottom-up, transparent mechanisms that promote information flows can help avoid troublesome 
disagreement (Milich and Varady 1999), while mitigating potential engagement exhaustion that threatens 
sustained interest in participation. And finally, economic and regulatory frameworks are important for 
addressing third-party impacts of pumping that require regulation. As one country pumps groundwater, 
neighboring countries may require more resources (energy and related cost) to access dropping 
groundwater levels. Therefore, regulatory frameworks are needed to improve transboundary policies 
(Varady et al. 2016). 
 
But despite the potential of well-designed, context-relevant, and well-intentioned treaties, as Giordano et 
al. (2014) have shown, there exist very few such instruments.  And those that have been put into place can 
languish and remain ineffective, as the Guarani Treaty has been (Sugg et al. 2015). New ideas for 
overcoming these obstacles may arise from concepts and paradigms generated by broad, global-scale 
discussions among researchers, officials, NGOs, and other stakeholders—including, but not limited to the 
international legal scholarship community. 
 
4.0 Global initiatives for transboundary groundwater governance  
 
We have seen above that groundwater and the aquifers that contain it have numerous international 
dimensions—most especially when these span national boundaries. The preceding sections have 
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discussed international governance mechanisms, frameworks, principles, and legal regimes, including 
treaties.  But these aspects of transboundary groundwater management can be seen to exist within a 
broader, more expansive context: products of a growing emphasis on natural resources policies and 
governance, with special emphasis on water in general and groundwater in particular. It’s worthwhile 
taking a step back to trace the origins of this globalization of groundwater governance. 
  
With roots in the 1970s’ energy crisis that affected the entire planet, the concept of “soft-path” 
approaches to development emerged with thinkers like Amory Lovins. Lovins (1977) and others posited 
that “benign” means could be as effective as more traditional, “hard-path,” supply-enhancement solutions 
that relied on engineering solutions, large public-works projects, and fossil fuels.  By the early 2000s, this 
mode of thinking was adapted to water management.  Peter Gleick, in an influential 2002 article in 
Nature, stated that “the world is awakening to the need to rethink fundamentally the way freshwater 
resources are distributed, managed and used. For Gleick, the soft-path, demand-oriented alternative to 
hard-path management of water resources could be defined as “rational application of technology and 
economics, and . . . decision-making at the right scale” (Gleick 2002). 
 
This insight of seeing development as dependent on governance, policies, management, and demand—
and not just supply and infrastructure—took hold internationally. It was manifested in the nearly universal 
acknowledgment of the overarching importance of sustainability—the need to plan effectively and 
efficiently for the development of resources so as to leave sufficient quantities for future generations 
(WCED 1987, “The Brundtland Report”). At roughly the same time—beginning in the 1990s—the world 
experienced a palpable flurry in the establishment of awareness-raising institutions that sought to 
influence affairs—in this case, water management.  
 
These institutions, known as Global Water Initiatives (GWI), were of several types. Most venerable 
among them were professional societies such as the International Association of Hydrological Sciences 
and the International Association of Hydrogeologists8, to name just two relevant ones. These societies 
were joined by growing ranks of thematically-oriented organizations, most prominently the Global Water 
Partnership and the World Water Council. Next, to inspire communication, cooperation, and action, large 
gatherings were organized: specialized conferences such as the 1992 Dublin Water Conference9, six 
World Water Forums since 2000, and two Budapest Water Summits (2013 and 2016). And last, mostly 
via the auspices of the United Nations, countries joined to declare designated periods meant to promote 
awareness of certain themes such as sanitation and health and international cooperation.10 By means of 
education, information-sharing, agenda-setting, and face-to-face meetings, these organized initiatives 
began constituting a sort of non-hegemonic form of global water governance (Varady et al. 2008, Varady 
et al. 2009). 
 
One of the notable accomplishments of GWIs has been their collective role in identifying promising 
management paradigms. On the heels of the adoption of sustainability, taking a page from the existing 
concept of integrated pest management—which dates to World War II—an analogue was proposed for 
water: Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM).11 IWRM has sometimes been criticized for 
various reasons (see Mukhtarov and Gerlak 2014)., including not being sufficiently integrated with 
sectors other than the water sector (e.g., Saravanan et al. 2009, Medema et al. 2008, Jeffrey and Gearey 
2006). Nonetheless, the approach has been adopted by most nations and incorporated into their plans. 
                                                 
8 Whose mission is to “further the understanding, wise use and protection of groundwater resources throughout the 
world.” 
9 Which issued the influential “Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development.” 
10 The International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-90) and the United Nations International 
Year of Water Cooperation (2013). 
11 The chief proponent and architect of IWRM has been the Global Water Partnership (GWP 2009, GWP 2000). 
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Partly in response to the above critique, the Nexus approach has taken hold internationally. It maintains 
that in view of their inseparability, water, energy, and food must be considered, and therefore managed 
simultaneously. The notion of water security, which we discuss throughout, also can be seen as an 
outcome of the actions and deliberations of participants in GWIs. 
 
As part of this internationalization of water, groundwater has benefited from the new attention to soft-path 
approaches to management. Until recently, aquifers were in place to be exploited. For the large majority 
of them, their spatial extents, depths, and volumes were largely unknown.  The quality of their waters was 
equally undetermined, as were the portions of their volumes belonging to each nation bordering on 
transnational aquifers. Similarly, practices, land and water ownership regimes, laws, and regulations were 
poorly understood.  
 
But in the early 2000s—on the heels of persistent droughts in the Sahel, overexploitation in South Asia, 
and population-driven increased throughout the developing world—organizations such as UNESCO’s 
International Hydrological Programme (IHP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and International 
Association of Hydrogeologists began addressing the management of groundwater. Most prominently, 
the Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management program (ISARM) began operating in 2002. 
ISARM’s objective has been to rectify the previously-noted inadequate understanding of scientific, 
socioeconomic, legal, institutional and environmental issues related to the management of transboundary 
aquifers. Though a concerted mapping effort led by IGRAC, the International Groundwater Resources 
Assessment Center in The Netherlands, ISARM has produced detailed maps of the world showing the 
physical extent of 592 identified transboundary aquifers (IGRAC 2015). ISARM has been especially 
active in providing information on such aquifers in the Balkan region of southeastern Europe, in Saharan 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the Americas. In 2010, ISARM organized a prominent conference in 
Paris, featuring 108 papers presentations (ISARM 2010). 
 
ISARM enlisted GEF—an interagency organization that coordinates technical assistance and funding for 
global environmental programs, and itself a result of a global initiative, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit—to 
support its Transboundary Waters Assessment Programme (TWAP). Since 2005 TWAP has worked to 
assess, evaluate, and develop policy regarding transnational aquifers (Puri and Aureli 2005). In 2011, 
following the ISARM conference, GEF teamed with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) to focus explicitly on groundwater governance. This was achieved via a multiyear project, 
“GEF-FAO Groundwater Governance Project: A Global Framework for Country Action.” The enterprise 
commissioned 12 thematic papers on “key economic, policy, institutional, environmental and technical 
aspects of groundwater management,” and tackled “emerging issues and innovative approaches” (FAO 
2016, Varady et al. 2013). Although it addressed not only transboundary groundwater, the GEF-FAO 
project yielded the most concerted review and analysis to-date of global governance of groundwater 
resources. In addition to the thematic papers, the project also produced three summary documents: Shared 
Global Vision for 2030, Global Framework for Action, and Global Diagnostic (GEF 2016). 
 
These concerted efforts, stemming from a concerted consciousness-raising initiative, have yielded a body 
of research grounded in field studies and accompanied by concrete prescriptions for transboundary 
groundwater governance. They complement the parallel endeavors of the individuals and institutions 
seeking legal instruments for managing transboundary groundwater. 
 
5.0 Recommendations for enhancing transboundary groundwater security  
 
Given the physical characteristics of groundwater, which we couple with an appreciation of international 
legal mechanisms and trends in global initiatives for transboundary groundwater, we posit six 
recommendations to enhance transboundary groundwater security. 
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These include: (1) enhancing international enforcement (e.g., Wouters and Hendry 2009, Mumme 2000); 
(2) consolidating governance at the transboundary aquifer scale (e.g., Linton and Brooks 2011); (3) 
prioritizing future water uses (e.g., Gleeson et al. 2012, Linton and Brooks 2011); (4) promoting 
conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water (e.g., Famiglietti 2014, de Chaisemartin et al. 2017); 
(5) expanding institutional capacity (Varady et al. 2016), and (6) integrating lessons from other 
subsurface resources (e.g., Gupta and Bavinck 2014, McCaffrey 2011, Nanni and Foster 2005, Eckstein 
and Eckstein 2005).   
 
5.1 Enhancing international enforcement mechanisms   
 
Customary international law is limited in its ability to implement new policies, and many researchers have 
argued that there is a need for enforcement mechanisms at the international level (e.g., Wouters and 
Hendry 2009, Mumme 2000).12 However, even prior to devising mechanisms for enforcement, gaining 
international agreement on a new set of binding regulations is challenging and time-consuming—for 
example, as seen above, the Draft Articles of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers were finalized in draft 
form in 2008, but have yet to be adopted by the UN.  
 
Typically, customary international norms become binding through bilateral or multilateral treaties devised 
among a limited number of riparian states or thought relevant court decisions, as with the 1997 ICJ 
decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. Wolf (1999) reviewed nearly 150 treaties and found that 
treaty designs typically address the basin’s unique characteristics, suggesting the critical nature of 
location-specific social, political, and environmental factors to the implementation of international norms 
(Conca 2006). Wide-ranging enforcement of more generalized laws at the international level may 
undermine this approach. Further, the need for adaptive governance is particularly salient for 
transboundary groundwater due to physical system complexities, such as delayed impacts and irreversible 
effects (Dietz et al. 2003, Gleeson et al. 2012). While mechanisms to enforce minimum requirements, 
particularly with respect to the duty to cooperate—a key principle of water law—at the international level 
would be helpful, other researchers emphasize the need for flexibility in international legal regimes to 
accommodate site-specific details and adapt to changing conditions (Varady et al. 2016).  
 
5.2 Consolidating governance at the transboundary aquifer scale 
 
For transboundary surface water, consolidating management at the watershed scale (e.g., IWRM) has had 
mixed outcomes (see Benson 2015). Although most international treaties and river basin organizations are 
designed around basin-level integration, these are often critiqued for overemphasizing technical 
approaches (Gerlak and Mukhtarov 2016), under-representing politics and social diversity, and mistaking 
hydrologic boundaries for governance mechanisms (Cohen and Davidson 2011). Some argue that 
consolidating governance at the aquifer scale is less problematic than doping so at the watershed scale—
any watershed is a sub-unit of a larger watershed, however aquifers typically have limited extents and are 
not subsets of larger aquifers (Linton and Brooks 2011). Despite having limited extents, groundwater 
aquifers can be hydrologically connected to broader physical systems. Unconfined aquifers can directly 
impact stream flow and confined aquifers depend on precipitation and infiltration from specific recharge 
areas. To accommodate the larger or more complex physical system, others suggest taking a systems 
perspective, or “problemshed” approach (Mollinga et al. 2007, Wescoat and Halvorson 2016), that 
designs governance to accommodate all relevant system components, and is not based on a particular 
geographic scale.  
 
5.3 Prioritizing future water uses 
                                                 
12 The Draft Bellagio Treaty leaves actual enforcement to the “internal administrative agencies of each country” 
(Hayton and Utton 1989). 
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Governance regimes originally designed for surface water often serve as bases for groundwater 
governance regimes, or are merely extended to cover groundwater in addition to surface water without 
significant revision (Mechlem 2012). However, Schlager (2006) points out that surface-water regimes 
frequently fail to address the problems that arise in groundwater-resource systems. For example, the 
notion of prior appropriation is the cornerstone of surface water policy in the western United States. 
When applied to groundwater, however, this principle prioritizes existing and historic uses, thus 
encouraging overextraction and failing to promote sustainable groundwater use and long-term water 
storage (Schlager 2006). Gleeson et al. (2012) view prioritization of future use for groundwater as a 
value-driven choice to sustain groundwater supplies for future generations.   
In confined aquifers, annual extraction rates may exceed recharge rates. If extraction rates are not 
managed over time, aquifer water levels may continuously decline. Alternatively, active groundwater 
management, including enhanced and controlled recharge and water banking, may be necessary to 
preserve aquifers (Schlager 2006). However, existing policies may not be sufficient to improve aquifer 
sustainability. Policy timelines (which are in the range of five to ten years) typically do not align with the 
time scale of groundwater system problems, which require long-term management plans on the order of 
50 to 100 years (Gleeson et al. 2012). For example, due to slow groundwater flow rates, groundwater 
pollution may not be detected immediately. Thus, the principle of no significant harm should be 
prioritized for groundwater aquifers, as these geologic formations can be very expensive and difficult to 
remediate (Linton and Brooks 2011).  
 
Similarly, at the international level, the principle of equitable and reasonable use prioritizes current and 
historic uses over sustainability. Linton and Brooks (2011) argue further that future uses be prioritized in 
transboundary aquifers. They relate five considerations to guide the application of international law 
principles to transboundary aquifers to promote long-term viability: (1) social and political equity, (2) 
economic efficiency, (3) ecological sustainability, (4) importance of demand management, and (5) 
implementability. 
 
5.4 Promoting conjunctive surface water-groundwater management  
 
The connection between groundwater and surface water systems is well-known (Famiglietti 2014)—in 
well-connected systems, groundwater depletion can draw water away from streams, surface water 
diversions can reduce groundwater recharge, and limited recharge can impact groundwater-dependent 
ecosystems (Margat and van der Gun 2013, Kløve et al. 2014). Based on the physical connection between 
groundwater and surface water, the principle of hydrological unity suggests holistic management of 
surface water and groundwater as a single resource (Eckstein and Eckstein 2003).  
 
Existing treaties have addressed this in various ways. The Watercourses Convention intentionally used the 
term “watercourse” to acknowledge that groundwater and surface water were part of a broader water 
system (albeit excluding confined aquifers) (UN 1997). Although never ratified, the Bellagio Treaty 
advocated for the conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater, noting the potential benefits it would 
have for distributional and use efficiency. However, the Bellagio Treaty also acknowledged how the 
diverse and complex hydrological arrangements between groundwater and surface water may produce 
institutional challenges for coordinated management, and thus suggested that conjunctive management be 
utilized only “where appropriate” (Hayton and Utton 1989). However, conjunctive management, which 
allows for water needs to be fulfilled from either surface or groundwater sources, often requires adaptive 
management. But, shifting all water demands onto groundwater sources during drought periods can lead 
to overuse and depletion, unless maximum extraction rates are also enforced. For example, the city of 
Hermosillo in Mexico experienced a severe drought in the late 1990s and early 2000s that led farmers and 
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municipalities to rely on groundwater without restriction, resulting in a depleted aquifer and its associated 
challenges (Scott and Pasqualetti 2010).  
 
5.5 Expanding institutional capacity 
 
Academic and policy literature alike consider institutional capacity critical for effective transboundary 
water governance. In case studies of transboundary water management, the institutional capacity needed 
to accommodate social, political, or environmental change is consistently found to be a main determinate 
of success in shared water governance (Yoffe et al. 2003). At the transboundary aquifer level, institutions 
must facilitate decision-making among diverse actors who hold a broad range of values and perceptions 
on both (or all) sides of the border (Linton and Brooks 2011). Feitelson and Haddad (1995) recommend 
incremental progress as a strategy to mitigate conflict among diverse actors or multiple nations. Similarly, 
Mumme (2000) suggests step-wise solutions that build upon shared values and prior successes can also 
help solidify social support. An incremental approach has been successful in negotiations between the 
U.S. and Mexico where “minutes,” or itemized recommendations, are used to adjust and update the 
original 1944 Water Treaty (United States and Mexico 1944). These minutes provide a mechanism to 
address new challenges as they arise, without the need to renegotiate a new treaty (IBWC 2002). 
Furthermore, institutions need to manage adaptively, allowing for flexibility, integration of public input, 
and incorporation of new information (Wolf 2007). To incorporate adaptation, the U.S.-Mexico 1944 
Water Treaty allows for water deliveries between nations to be delayed or adjusted in quantity based on 
drought conditions (McCaffrey 2003).  
 
In addition to an incremental, flexible approach, building institutional capacity at the transboundary level 
may require addressing existing institutional asymmetries between nations. Aquifers shared between the 
U.S. and Mexico provide a stark example. In 2006, the U.S. Congress established the Transboundary 
Aquifer Assessment Program (TAAP) to create a binational cooperative framework,13 lay out specific 
steps for aquifer assessment, and eventually arrange for a joint funding mechanism (Megdal and Scott 
2011). The U.S.-Mexico TAAP aims to follow the guidelines set out in the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers. Under this program, U.S. institutions, primarily the U.S. Geological Survey along with 
university research centers, were funded to establish collaborative partnerships with Mexican institutions, 
such as the Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas (CILA), the Mexican branch of the binational 
International Boundary Waters Commission (IBWC), and CONAGUA, Mexico’s national water agency. 
Key to the success of these binational collaborations was the attention paid to differences in institutional 
capacity and the flexibility to adjust the structure of these cooperative frameworks in order to overcome 
asymmetries (Megdal and Scott 2011). By acknowledging institutional asymmetries and adjusting 
cooperative frameworks accordingly, the program was able to expand data collection activities and 
increase the exchange of information used to characterize binational aquifers (Megdal and Scott 2011).  
Others suggest that building institutional capacity at multiple levels, particularly the local level, can help 
to promote self-reliant and more equitable resource governance in border regions (Blomquist and Ingram 
2003, Dietz et al. 2003). While researchers find that case studies consistently show the important role of 
local institutional capacity in improved groundwater governance, they also reveal that governance 
activities are best shared among multiple levels and diverse actors (Varady et al. 2016). Although multi-
level, nested, and overlapping institutions are often proposed as an ideal solution, Garrick and Aylward 
(2012) note the need for specific guidelines that direct the growth of institutions toward effective and 
efficient solutions that avoid high costs of transactions between institutions. 
 
5.6 Integrating lessons from other subsurface resources  
 
                                                 
13 While the framework is binational, thus far, the funding for TAAP has been unilateral, from the U.S. side only. 
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Although most transboundary aquifers receive recharge from precipitation, some groundwater is non-
renewable. For these non-renewable groundwater resources, aquifers may store large volumes of water, 
but receive such low rates of recharge that they are not renewable on human timescales (Margat, Foster & 
Droubi 2006). Many researchers have suggested that governance of non-renewable transboundary 
groundwater might be guided by strategies employed for transboundary oil and gas (Gupta and Bavinck 
2014, McCaffrey 2011, Nanni and Foster 2005, Eckstein and Eckstein 2005). Yet there are important 
physical, political, and economic differences between fossil fuel and water resources to take into account. 
Oil and gas reservoirs are typically developed by commercial interests, who allocate costs and benefits 
based on the proportion of the resource that resides within each state (Eckstein and Eckstein 2005). Water 
resources are not developed as a commercial interest -- instead they are generally considered a basic 
human right (Gleick 1999). In arid areas, non-renewable groundwater aquifers may be the only water 
supply, and therefore must be accessible to all society (Nanni and Foster 2005). Further, groundwater is 
more vulnerable to resource degradation (e.g., pollution) than fossil fuel reservoirs (Nanni and Foster 
2005). However, lessons learned from transboundary fossil-fuel development may contribute to 
groundwater governance based on the similarities of a “hidden” resource that develops and changes over 




The critical role of groundwater in enhancing water security, globally and locally, remains undervalued. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that aquifers provide long-term water storage that buffers climate-change impacts, 
and supply critical support to ecosystems in many, particularly arid and semi-arid, regions. Groundwater 
resources are often more locally accessible as drinking water and irrigation sources, and are generally of 
higher quality than surface water thanks to natural filtration by sediment. Improving mechanisms for 
transboundary groundwater governance will have direct implications for overall societal water security.  
In this paper, we reviewed the status of international efforts to govern transboundary groundwater. We 
examined how groundwater’s unique physical characteristics and “hidden nature” pose significant 
management challenges that warrant an approach different than that used for surface water.  
 
Existing international legal mechanisms for transboundary groundwater remain limited and insufficient. 
Modern, progressive global initiatives offer new opportunities for revised thinking and more suitable 
approaches. These offer a growing role for new and more broadly representative actors and institutions, 
fresh perspectives, innovative paradigms, and effective strategies for promoting secure access to and use 
of shared groundwater resources. They represent efforts to address governance deficits by improving our 
understanding of—among other things—the legal, institutional, and governance dimensions of 
groundwater.  
 
Our recommendations are grounded in this historic and contextual understanding of the evolution of 
groundwater governance and in parallel, of transboundary resources management. Individually and 
collectively, these aim to enhance transboundary groundwater security. We have looked through the 
literature for ways to improve transboundary groundwater governance. While none of our suggestions 
represents an encompassing solution or panacea, we think that a combination of these approaches will 
promote progress toward improved governance.  
 
Our proposed actions include: (1) enhancing international enforcement mechanisms that are context-
specific and flexible enough to adapt to changing conditions; (2) consolidating governance at the 
transboundary aquifer scale, adopting a systems perspective that includes all relevant systems components 
including politics, social diversity, and equity; (3) prioritizing future water uses and “no significant harm” 
over “prior appropriation” or “equitable and reasonable use”; (4) promoting conjunctive surface water-
groundwater management via the principle of hydrological unity to enable a holistic management of water 
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as a single resource; (5) expanding institutional capacity by facilitating decision-making among diverse 
actors from all sides of an international border, in an incremental and flexible approach, while addressing 
institutional asymmetries; and (6) exploring what can be learned from governance of other subsurface 
resources (e.g., oil and gas), particularly for non-renewable groundwater resources (confined and fossil 
aquifers).  
These and related steps are not intended as a how-to manual for effective transboundary aquifer 
governance cum improved security.  Rather, they represent an overall attitude that draws on the 
generalized concepts of flexibility, adaptive capacity, public participation, sustainability, soft-path 
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